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There has been a constant resonance on the legality of mentioning artificial computing entity as an inventor the world 
over. There have been various instances of judicial decisions with an elaborate commentary on the legality of a robot or AI 
becoming the inventor of a patent. Considering the legal implications of AI being the inventors of inventions through 
identifying gaps by analysing tonnes of information through various big data analysing means, a new policy framework is 
necessitated. However, the big question that arises is, should the development of such inventions and their consequent 
patenting should be disallowed as the recent judgments have been made, or should there be regulations on inventorship of 
such patents and their resulting ownership. The present article attempts to give a prognosis for adapting a new legal 
viewpoint for considering the AI as an inventor rather than just rejecting them.  
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The fourth Industrial Revolution or Industry 4.0 was 
introduced with the prediction of revolution to be 
more focused towards the entire value chain of the 
product lifecycle and pitched towards providing the 
customer a more tailormade experience to the desired 
goods and services.1 The premise of Industry 4.0 
revolves around the central theme of automating the 
stages for producing and providing the goods and 
services respectively with the pinpoint accuracy of 
customer needs and expectations.2 This calls for 
comprehensive development of order management, 
R&D, manufacturing process commission, just-in-
time delivery, and product cycle management.3 
However, Industry 4.0 needs to be assessed 
differently from Computer Integrated Manufacturing 
(CIM), which has its roots in Industry 3.0.4  Figure 1 
illustrates the relative industrial revolutions in 
manufacturing and services.  
Figure 1 illustrates various stages of industrial 
revolutions in the past and present stage of scientific 
occurrence. The primary difference between Industry 
4.0 and CIM is the connectivity to the internet.5 In the 
case of CIM, the theme is more focused on worker 
less manufacturing, whereas Industry 4.0 is associated 
with the promotion of sensors, devices, and assets to 
be connected with each other and to the internet.6 
Consequently, Industry 4.0 has a basic principle of 
converting regular machines to entities having self-
awareness and self-learning abilities for their overall 
improvement in terms of their performance and also 
assess and predict the subsequent requirements of the 
industry.7 Artificial Intelligence (AI) has now taken a 
central stage on almost all discussions on Industry 4.0. 
AI deals with the construction and deployment of 
intelligent computer programs that would involve 
basic principles of intelligent behavior and their 
applications to animal and artificial systems.8 Almost 
all the work in AI is computational in nature and 
technique-oriented.8 AI thus could be viewed as a 
discourse of machines that could mimic human 
intelligence such as, cognitive ability, learning and 
decision making. This ability to learn is the central 
principle of working on AI-based systems. For 
example, applications such as, self-driven cars, 
—————— 
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computational gaming, image perception and 
recognition, etc., have a huge impact and implication 
onthe development of AI.9 There has been 
considerable development in the field of AI, and there 
is a projection of its futuristic impact on support in 
every human activity, including and as healthcare, 
communication, entertainment, business decisions, 
defense, etc. 9 
Consequently, there is a considerable push in 
securing rights over inventions that concern with AI 
and associated systems and processes.10 However, 
with the recent advent of certain decisions on inventor 
rights of inventions generated from AI, wherein such 
patent rights were denied to such inventions, call for a 
review of the existing archaic laws defining the new 
age systems and a considerable policy review on such 
legislations by the law-making and enforcement 
authorities.   
 
AI and Patent Litigations 
The patent applications in the AI sector have 
increased tremendously, especially in the last eight 
years. More than 75% of the AI patent applications 
have been filed in the last eight years, wherein the top 
technology giants such as IBM, Microsoft, Samsung, 
etc., participated wholeheartedly. The filing trend also 
shows a tough competition between the Chinese and 
the US innovators on the dominance over the AI 
space. Additionally, it was also observed that some 
areas such as neural networks, machine learning, 
image processing were leading technical areas  
on which the bulk of the study have been  
undertaken.  
 
Top Litigated Technology Areas 
The increase in the patent filing trend also has 
significantly increased the consequent litigation trend 
in the AI space. For instance, machine learning, image 
analysis, audio processing and neural networks are the 
major technology areas for litigation having patents 
on AI11 (Fig. 2). 
Figure 2 illustrates the major technology areas on 
litigation with inventions related to AI. It can be 
observed that the neural networks are the top litigated 
technical area, which also follows the trendline of the 
previously discussed section wherein it was observed 
that computer vision, which takes in neural network 
technology as its baseline as the major area of 
development in AI patenting arena. For instance, an 
AI infringement suit filed by electrocardiography 
device maker Alivecor against Apple alleges that 
Apple is infringing three of AliveCor's patents on 
cardiac diagnostic inventions.11 
It could be observed from the patenting as well as 
litigation trends on AI that technology-oriented 
organizations have started a race to secure patents in 
their major line of business, which they deem would 
affect in long as well as medium term. This results in 
enhanced litigation activity in such areas. As the 
litigation in these specific areas is extremely nascent 
in stage, sustained jurisprudence is yet to be 
developed in AI litigation in major jurisdictions, 
including the US and EU. 
 
AI and Inventor Rights 
The engineering involved in AI is getting more 
complex and sophisticated,12 and as a result, many 
organizations have started using AI as a tool of 
innovation that could come out with original ideas for 
a new product or component development.13 
However, this has to lead to a legal issue on patent 
law, i.e., how would the concept of patents apply to 
non-human beings? For addressing this issue, there 
are a number of deliberations on this frontier 
worldover.14 
The issue of artificial inventors as in patents related 
to AI came into the limelight when a patent 
application in 2018 and 2019 was filed by an AI 
system called DABUS (Device for Autonomous 
Bootstrapping of Unified Sentience) listed as the main 
inventor of the patent application. The applicant of the 
applications, Stephen Thaler, primarily filed the 
application in USPTO, EPO and UK and listed 
DABUS as the one who had "identified the novelty of 
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its own idea before a natural person did" and as a 
result, it should be considered as an inventor. All the 
three offices refused the applications citing that the 
relevant patent laws required that the inventors should 
be natural persons, and there was no provision on 
inventors as artificial in existing patent laws.  
 
UK Decision on DABUS 
The applicant, Dr. Stephen Thaler, filed two patent 
applications (GB 1816909.4 and GB 1818161.0) 
which originally didn't list any inventor in the 
application. The UK Patent Office subsequently 
notified the applicant ofthe requirement of filing the 
statement of inventorship for subsequent processing 
of the application under Section 13 of the Patent Act 
1977. Dr. Thaler subsequently filed the statement of 
inventorship on Form 7 for both applications in July 
2019. The statement of inventorship stated that the 
inventor was the artificial intelligence machine called 
DABUS, and he had acquired the rights of the 
application by "ownership of the creativity machine 
DABUS." 
The point of the moot in this litigation revolved 
around the point that "inventorship should not be 
restricted to natural persons, and the machine which 
meets the inventorship criteria like a natural person 
also qualifies as an inventor." The applicant 
contended that neither UK Patent Act, 1977 nor 
European Patent Convention Treaty specifically 
excludes protection for autonomous machine 
inventions. The applicant further argued that, as a 
matter of practice by EPO and the UK, inventorship 
for natural persons was relegated to prevent company 
inventorship. The arguments of the applicant 
contended that the inventions of autonomous 
machines could be patentable if it meets the 
requirement of patentability set out in the Act. The 
basic reason for establishing patent law was to 
incentivize innovation, disclosure and development of 
the invention. As long as an invention is addressing 
these issues, there is no change in the premise of the 
function between a human inventor and an artificial 
inventor. Failure to recognize the inventors (be it be a 
natural person or AI) would undermine the whole 
intellectual property system for failing to undermine 
the furtherance of innovation on socially recognized 
innovation needs. Additionally, patent laws also have 
the motive to protect the moral rights of inventors and 
infact, acknowledging the autonomous system as 
inventors would actually facilitate this function. This 
gives an assertion that in the reverse instance of 
inventorship, wherein if a human takes in the credit of 
an invention developed by the autonomous machine is 
equally wrong. With these arguments, the court 
acknowledged DABUS as an inventor of the current 
and any resultant patent with Dr. Thaler as assignee of 
any such patent.  
However, the primary concern in the case was on 
the declaration mentioned on Form 7, which 
contended on the absence of legal personality on the 
part of DABUS, and the application was not in the 
name of the said inventor but in the name of Dr. 
Thaler. The judges in this litigation cited the Yeda15 
case wherein they expressed the view that Section 7 is 
exhaustive in nature and has sufficiently explained 
who is entitled to grant a patent. The term in Section 
7(2) illustrates by the words "and to no other person" 
that further explains that the patent may be granted to 
the inventor or someone claiming through the 
inventor. That means an employer (as a most common 
example) or by way of inheritance or succession, etc., 
are few instances by which the rights are transferred 
from the inventor. When read with Section 13 of the 
Patent Act, 1977, emphasizes the subjective state of 
mind of the applicant. Section 13 (2) (a) specifically 
requires the applicant to identify the actual inventors. 
Further, Section 13 (2) (b) requires the applicant to 
indicate the deprivation of his right to be granted the 
patent. For instance, an applicant may believe A as an 
inventor has assigned his rights to the applicant and 
may be wrong in the scenario. In normal cases, this 
may be difficult to prove by the patent office in every 
case. However, such instances make it liable for 
rejection, under Section 72 (1) (b) of the Patent Act 
1977, providing the ground of rejection/revocation on 
the grounds that the patent was granted to a person 
who was not entitled to be granted that patent.  
Furtherance to the contention of the applicant, on 
the ground that the applicant must be a person, the 
Court observed that DABUS is not a legal person 
because it has not been conferred upon it a legal 
personality by Law. For instance, in the case of 
corporations, actual legislations help to create a legal 
persona, which is not present in the present case. In 
the absence of any statutory legal intervention, AI 
cannot be recognized as a legal personality. 
Therefore, DABUS cannot be an applicant.  
On the contention that DABUS may be considered 
as an inventor, the Court relied upon Section 7 (2) (a), 
Section 7 (2) (b) and Section 7 (2) (c). Section 7 (2) 




(a) provides the right to be granted patent is given 
primarily to the inventor or joint inventor, which 
could be overridden in two situations as illustrated in 
Section 7 (2) (b) and section 7 (2) (c) that states that 
another person was entitled to the invention by either 
any enactment or the rule of law, treaty or 
international convention, or any enforceable 
agreement entered with such inventor before the 
making of such invention. This is generally the case 
in employments. The second situation (under Section 
7 (2) (c)) arises when there are successor in the title of 
any person as mentioned in Section 7 (2) (a) and 
Section 7 (2) (c). The Court opined that all the cases 
mentioned under Section 7 (2) are related to persons, 
and Dr. Thaler was contending that the inventor was 
not necessary a person; this argument was rejected on 
the grounds of out of scope under Section 7. 
Further, the court argued that in the Patent Act 
1977, the meaning the inventor is always a person on 
the grounds that: 
a. A person can have the property, and an 
invention, application for patent and a patent are 
all property rights. 
b. Section 7 (2) (a) and Section 7 (2) (b) 
clearly define themselves by reference to a 
"person" that can transfer the inventor's rights. 
In the present case, Dr. Thaler abjured the status of 
inventor where he stated DABUS as the inventor, and 
the fact was stated that DABUS is not a person and 
was incapable of transferring the rights to Dr. Thaler 
because since DABUS is a thing, and not a person, it 
cannot hold, or transfer any rights. Hence the 
application was rejected. 
 
EU Decision on DABUS 
Dr. Thaler filed two patent applications at the EPO 
(EP 18275163 and EP 18275174) with DABUS as an 
inventor in both the applications. In both the 
applications, Dr. Thaler contended that DABUS 
identified the novelty before any natural person did, 
and therefore, such the machine needs to be 
considered as an inventor. Dr. Thaler considered 
himself as the applicant wherein he employed DABUS 
and acted as the successor of the title. The EPO 
rejected the application stating that the requirements 
of Article 81 of EPC (European Patent Convention) 
has not complied with that stated that the designation 
of the inventorship. Furtherance to Rule 19 (1) of the 
EPC, the article states that the designation of the 
inventor shall state the family name, given name and 
full address of the inventor, contain the statement 
under Article 81 and bear the signature of the 
applicant. Therefore, in the stated application, the real 
issue was the inventor, as mentioned by Dr. Thaler, 
was not human but a machine (DABUS). The EPO 
primarily relied upon the following grounds16 for 
refusal: 
(i) As observed under Article 81 and Rule 19(1) 
of the EPC, there is explicit mention about the 
inventor being a natural person, and there was no 
existing law that regarded the machine as a person 
capable of being designated as an inventor.  
(ii) EPO stated that names given to natural 
persons do not have the same status as that of 
machines. The name of a natural person not only 
identifies a person but also identifies the right of 
inventorship, transfer of those rights and associated 
capabilities. This is not present for names identified 
with machines.  
(iii) EPO also affirmed that AI machines have “no 
rights because they have no legal personality” since 
there is no legislation or jurisprudence establishing 
such legal fiction.  
(iv) EPO also observed that since machines have 
no legal persona, they can neither be employed nor 
transfer any rights, including the right of inventorship, 
and therefore, Dr. Thales' claim of employing DABUS 
or associated successor in the title has no  
legal ground. 
 
US Decision on DABUS 
In the US, the USPTO denied the application titled 
“Devices and methods for attracting enhanced 
attention,” having application no 16/524350. The 
impugned application was filed listing a single 
inventor with the name “DABUS” and with the family 
name “Invention generated by AI.” The assignee was 
named “Stephen Thaler.” The substitute statement 
under 37 CFR 1.64 in lieu of declaration under 35 
USC 115 (d). Furtherance to this, an assignment 
document assigning the entire right, title and interest 
for the application transferred to Dr. Thaler was 
presented wherein it identified Dr. Thaler as  
both legal representative and the applicant for the 
inventor. Further, communication was sent to file 
additional details of the inventor wherein the 
presented details were not sufficient to identify the 
inventor with his/her legal name in addition to an  
US $80 fine on delay for failure to submit  
inventor declaration.  




The applicant conveyed that the “creativity 
machine” DABUS is a series of neural networks 
programmed and trained with general information to 
independently create inventions. The USPTO cited 35 
USC 100(a) that stated inventor as “the individual or, 
if a joint invention, the individuals collectively who 
invented or discovered the subject matter of the 
invention.” In addition to this, the USPTO also cited 
the litigations of Univ of Utah v Max Plank 
Gesellschaft Zur Forderung der Wissenschaftene V,17 
Burroughs Wellcome Co. v Barr Labs Inc18and Beech 
Aircraft Corp. v EDO Corp,19 wherein, all the cited 
cases projected the assertion that “only natural 
persons can be inventors.” USPTO projected that the 
inventor is a natural person has been reflected in 
multiple court decisions and references in Title 37 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations. The USPTO also 
cited MPEP (Manual of Patent Examining Procedure) 
concerning inventorship explaining that the most 
important question for inventorship is “conception” 
with further explanation of “conception” being “the 
complete performance of the mental part of the 
inventive act” and “the formation in the mind of the 
inventor of a definite and permanent idea of the 
complete and operative invention as it is thereafter to 
be applied in practice.” Here the terms “mental” and 
“mind” are recurring and referring to a natural person. 
The USPTO rejected the contention of the applicant 
on the inclusion of DABUS as the inventor of the cited 
patent application.  
Based on the above study and analysis, the 
following gaps were identified: 
(i) Though the legality of the USPTO on 
requirements of the natural person being an inventor 
is a debatable issue, a wide gap exists on the issue in 
other jurisdictions such as India. 
(ii) Since this is recent litigation and the 
consequent jurisprudence on AI inventions is limited 
in patent law, a certain direction is missing in the 
literature on the legal footing of “persons” capable of 
being inventors. 
 
Probable Positions in other Jurisdictions: India 
With the advent of litigations arising out on the 
issue of inventorship taking a central space in major 
patent offices, it is imperative that this issue will 
surface in India and other patent offices; the question 
is not “if” but “when.” Examining the Indian Patent 
Law provisions on dealing with the relevant issues 
would help the Indian Patent Office (IPO) to be better 
prepared on dealing with issues on applications 
mentioning the machine as inventors.  
The Indian Patents Act, 1970, has few provisions20 
on dealing with the qualifications of an applicant, 
specifically Section 6, which mentions that a patent 
application can be made by: 
a. any person claiming to be the true and first 
inventor of the invention; 
b. any person being the assignee of the person 
claiming to be the true and first inventor in respect of 
the right to make such an application; 
c. the legal representative of any deceased 
person who immediately before his death was entitled 
to make such an application; 
d. either alone or jointly with any of the above-
mentioned points (a-d). 
Furtherance to Section 6, few provisions under 
Section 2 illuminate the stress on the legal footing of 
a person mentioning: 
a. "Assignee" includes an assignee of the 
assignee and the legal representative of a deceased 
assignee, and references to the assignee of any person 
include references to the assignee of the legal 
representative or assignee of that person. 
b. "Patentee" means the person for the time 
being entered on the register as the grantee or 
proprietor of the patent. 
c. "Person" includes the Government. 
d. "Person interested" includes a person engaged 
in, or in promoting, research in the same field as that 
to which the invention relates. 
In all the above four considerations, the provision 
“person” comes into the forefront that would have all 
the relevance on deciding issues on the probable 
cause of action. However, whether the interpretation 
of the word “person” as in the three jurisdictions 
ultimately denying the patent application is quite 
debatable in India. There would be two schools of 
thought into it: 
 
The legality of AI Systems as a Person 
The most important debate on the legality of AI as “a 
person” (to be capable of being an inventor) is the 
required jurisprudential interpretation into it. The 
jurisprudential background on considering AI not to be 
excluded from the list of “persons” can be inspired by 
Salmond21 that states that a person is any being whom 
the law regards as capable of rights or duties. In other 
words, any being having the capability of rights and 
duties, whether human or not, is a person. Salmond 




further explains that legal persons may be of any kind as 
the law pleases. For considering AI as a legal person, 
where there is no history to construe such, there has to 
be a beginning in the jurisprudential thought processing. 
Considering the history of giving legal status to 
corporations and other entities, it is observed that there 
has been an entire jurisprudential construction of needs 
and necessities to the urgent requirement of the public at 
that time. Similarly, for an organic evolution of school 
of thought on legal sciences, there has to be tandem 
progress in accordance with the growth in socio-
economic-scientific sectors of the society. For instance, 
in India and few other jurisdictions, legal personality has 
been bestowed to non-living non-corporate entities such 
as rivers, idols, etc. The Supreme Court of India, in the 
case of M Siddiq v Suresh Das22, decided if Lord Ram is 
a legal person. The Supreme Court cited Roscoe Pound23 
with the following passage: 
“In civilized lands, even in the modern world, it has 
happened that all human beings were not legal 
persons. In Roman Law, down to the Constitution of 
Antonius Pius, the slave was not a person. He enjoyed 
neither rights of family nor rights of patrimony. He was 
a thing, and as such, like animals, could be the object 
of rights of property. … In French colonies, before 
slavery was there abolished, slaves were put in the 
class of legal persons by the Statute of April 23, 1833, 
and obtained a somewhat extended juridical capacity 
by a statute of 1845. In the United States, down to the 
Civil War, the free Negroes in many of the States were 
free human beings with no legal rights.” 
The Court stated that there is continuous 
development on the definition of legal persons, 
from the time where legal personality was denied 
to slaves to equality of rights of all-natural persons 
as legal persons in the eyes of the law. It construes 
that a legal person has the capacity to bear 
interests, rights and responsibilities. On the 
question of legal personality, the Court interpreted 
Salmondas: 21 
“Legal persons, being the arbitrary creations of 
the law, maybe as of as many kinds as the law 
pleases. Those which are actually recognized by our 
own system; however, all fall within a single class, 
namely corporations or bodies corporate. A 
Corporation is a group or series of persons which by 
legal fiction is regarded and treated as itself a person. 
If, however, we take account of other systems of our 
own, we find that the conception of legal personality 
is not so limited in its application…” 
Considering the last line of Salmond, i.e., “legal 
personality is not so limited in its application, it 
could open up the doors for newer frontiers on 
construing AI as a possible system for being 
recognized as a legal person. The Supreme Court 
observed that, theoretically, there is no restriction 
on what fields the recognition of legal personality 
may be bestowed. The most important criteria to 
answer this is the actual purpose for doing so. In 
doing so, the court recognized the personification 
of the idol Lord Rama as having distinct legal 
rights and duties.  
Taking the corollary of corporations being 
recognized as legal persons, it was observed that 
the legal personality of the corporation was 
originally granted by a positive act of the 
government. Prior to this, the independent legal 
personality of a corporation was never dependent 
on recognition by the Courts.22 In fact, Smith24 
further elaborates that the function of legal 
personality is to regulate the behavior or conduct 
of the being on which the rights and duties are 
conferred. This is motivated to control and 
regulate the conduct of the legal person and the 
human towards each other to suit the purpose of 
the well-being of the society. Another argument 
citing on recognition of AI as a new legal persona 
is the subject of convenience. The bestowal of 
legal recognition on non-humans or objects has 
been a powerful tool of policymaking for 
adjudication of claims in a practical manner. 
Creating a framework helps in serving the 
settlement of disputes and saved the judicial effort 
on deferring to distinguish between artificial and 
natural persons in every dispute where it was not 
relevant. Therefore, the Courts, in fact, confer the 
rights as judicial persons to artificial entities to 
adjudicate upon claims of natural persons deriving 
benefits from or affected by the corpus of the legal 
personality.    
Considering the arguments above, and with the 
upcoming needs of advancement of science in AI 
particularly, and the sustained growth of AI patent 
filing statistics, it is imperative to observe that 
certainly policy manifestations have to be reviewed 
for including AI as a part of non-living legal 
personality vertical. The arguments put forward in the 
judgments of the patent offices on DABUS and 
consequent rejection of the application would be 
difficult to hold ground in India.  




Potential Difficulty in Considering Legality of AI Systems as a 
Person 
While there are compact arguments on putting a 
special case of legalizing the AI as a recognized legal 
persona, however, the patent office actions are 
procedural in nature and,on their own, do not create new 
law on their own. For instance, the patent office 
controllers, while following the quasi-judicial authority 
bestowed to them, can only interpret the law and cannot 
make the law, for which there is already a separate set 
procedure. The relevant chapter for understanding the 
actual provisions of the Indian Patents Act is Chapter 15, 
which enumerates the powers of the controllers from 
Section 77 to Section 81. Section 77 bestows the powers 
of a Civil Court to the Controller on certain aspects such 
as taking into cognizance of evidence, examining 
documents, affidavits, etc. or any other matter that may 
be prescribed. Section 78 and Section 79 illustrate the 
power of the Controller for correcting the clerical errors 
and the procedure of submitting the evidence to the 
Controller, respectively. However, Section 80 gives 
certain discretionary powers to the controller. However, 
these discretionary powers are only related to providing 
opportunity on hearings and consequent disposal of the 
patent application according to the principles of natural 
justice. As a result, the current state of the Indian Patents 
Act doesn’t have any provision for considering a non-
recognized entity (person) as an inventor according to 
Section 6 of the Act.  
 
Conclusion  
In light of the discussions put forward, the author 
believes that, though suitable jurisprudence is available, 
a positive action needs to be taken to bring out clarity on 
the subjective policy for considering AI as a non-living 
legal personality. Extending the common law 
jurisprudence and citations of cases, along with non-
clarification of existing policies on AI, would render the 
deliverables on legal clarity an unjust delay. For 
instance, in the case of Bishwanath Prasad Radhey 
Shyam v Hindustan Metal Industries25 the Supreme 
Court cites the Humpherson v Syer26, which stated that 
patent could not be granted by any means, whatsoever, 
apart from the true and the first inventor himself. The 
Supreme Court mentions that the true and the first 
inventor or his legal representative or assignee submits 
an application in a prescribed form to the patent office. 
The application must (emphasis) contain a declaration to 
the effect that the applicant must be in possession of the 
invention. Considering this requirement and extending 
the argument that there has to be some document that 
assigns the right of the inventor to the applicant, the 
argument in favor of DABUS decisions seems stronger 
at the present time. However, a policy level interference 
would help to give a clearer objective direction on the 
role of patent offices in such a crucial decision-making 
pedestal on patents related to AI. For instance, as 
relevant to legal bodies, such as corporations, the 
directors are considered to be responsible as the legal 
personalities of the conduct of such non-legal entities, 
recognition in the line of corporations, wherein the 
owner of such AI entity would be the ultimate 
responsible person answerable to all the legal 
compliances, could be created. Time is of the essence, 
and the question is not if, but when, the AI takes over the 
creations of inventions for our future survival and sanity.  
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